Slugger 2024 end of year review and the prospects for 2025

In preparing for the Slugger end of year review I had a quick look back at the 74 OPs I published on Slugger during the year to refresh my memory of the key events of the year, or at least those that grabbed my attention.

Half were on rugby where I concluded that Ireland had had a good year despite our provinces failing to win anything. Winning the 6 Nations, tying s series in South Africa, winning 3 out of 4 November internationals, and ending the year ranked #2 in the world is not to be sniffed at. Irish athletes also had a successful Olympics, with four gold and three bronze medals ranking us 19^th in the international medal table – our highest ever ranking. Northern Ireland also had a record 6 Olympic medal winners with three competing for Team Ireland and three for Team GB.

Of the remaining OPs, 20 were on Irish and UK/NI politics, 10 were on the US elections and a few were on blogging and an April Fool yarn. We had the local and European elections in the south, the UK and Irish general elections, and the US Presidential and Congressional elections to keep us political nerds busy. Based on the trends as seen in the US polling aggregators especially in the last two weeks of the campaign, I called it for Trump but did not anticipate his margin of victory with the polls getting it wrong once again. (However contrary to Trump’s claims of a landslide victory, he did not manage to win 50% of the popular vote).

Trump’s victory, when combined with Republican wins in the House and Senate and dominance of the Supreme Court means there is nothing to prevent Trump implementing the Project 2025 agenda he disowned during the campaign but seems to have re-embraced in his early proposed appointments. Kamala Harris simply didn’t conform to the “strongman” stereotype many Americans seem to feel is needed to run America and the world.

My concluding argument was that Trump 2.0 will be nothing like Trump 1.0. This time around he has an army of committed MAGA loyalists ready and prepared to implement his agenda at every level of government. 40 out of the 44 cabinet members who served in Trump’s 1.0 administration refused to endorse him this time around, including his former Vice President Mike Pence, (not to mention former Republican President and Vice President George Bush and Dick Cheney).

From an Irish and Northern Irish perspective this creates a number of risks for 2025:

1. The US and world economy is currently growing at a very healthy 3% per annum and this is currently forecast to continue for the next few years. However, if Trump fully implements his programme for the US economy, he could crash it in the short term – Elon Musk’s target of saving $2 trillion from the federal budget (c. 30%) and the expulsion of millions of immigrants (both legal and illegal) would, if actually implemented, be devastating for the US and world economy in the short term.
2. Trump tariff walls could dramatical cut world trade, increase inflation, and reduce the growth potential of the world economy. Ireland, as a very open economy, would be particularly vulnerable. Trump’s Commerce Department pick, Howard Lutnick, has specifically targeted Ireland’s trade surplus with the USA as an area to be tackled (€35 Billion in the first nine months of this year alone). Irish pharmaceutical exports to the US are particularly vulnerable.
3. Trump’s plans to repatriate manufacturing and intellectual property and the profits thereof to the US through incentives and reductions in corporate tax rates could have a particularly severe impact on the Irish economy. Ireland’s government budget surplus of somewhere north of €25 Billion in 2024 could be crossing the Atlantic if the Trump administration has its way.
4. Trump’s refusal to back Ukraine and Europe against Putin’s aggression could result in many more deaths, Ukraine losing territory, Eastern European states (and former Soviet Satellites) feeling very threatened, and a huge re-militarisation of the continent, with scarce resources re-directed to military expenditure and energy security. The relatively benign European social model could be at risk with big cuts in social expenditure and investments elsewhere.
5. If Trump gives a blank cheque to his friend and ally Netanyahu, the middle east conflicts could intensify and broaden. This will increase immigration pressures on the European subcontinent at a time when infrastructure and political tolerance is already stretched. Germany, France, Italy, Hungary, Romania, and other countries have already seen the emergence of widespread far right movements in response to indigenous populations feeling under pressure.
6. With Trump’s hostility to the EU, the USA may seek to drive a wedge between the EU and the UK resulting in those economies diverging rather than converging as is currently the case. This could make GB/NI trade even more difficult than at present.

However, there are also factors which could mitigate these risks:

1. Trump is only in power for 4 years and may only have a congressional majority for two if the mid-term elections go badly for him. Nevertheless, US presidents have considerable discretion in foreign and trade policies independent of Congress. Last time around he had relatively little success in implementing his agenda – beyond corporate tax reductions, appointing conservative judges, avoiding further foreign military interventions, and some limited tariff measures – although my argument is that the far right of US politics is far more organised this time around.
2. US Multinationals have many billions invested in manufacturing in Ireland and are unlikely to abandon those investments any time soon. Intellectual property is more mobile, however, and could be moved to the US if corporate taxation there is reduced to 15%. However, if (say) Microsoft were to book its profits on European sales in the USA, the EU could respond with retaliatory tariffs on Microsoft products and services. Irish companies employ more workers in the USA than US companies employ here, so strange as that might seem, Ireland is not without some leverage in its dealings with the USA.
3. There is a view that at least some of Trump’s more extreme pronouncements are performative and intended to shift the Overton window of what constitutes realistic debate – a sort of pre-negotiation tactic to soften up the other side who will then be grateful for any mitigation. Trump has been known to do a hard sell on deals that are nothing like what he promised he would do. But he has also activated a whole MAGA movement of extremely nationalist activists and administrators who may take him at his word and pursue some very extreme policies with no regard for their implications for the rest of the world.

—oo0oo—

Thanks to the vagaries of the FPTP voting system, Labour won a landslide victory in the UK general election despite securing less votes than Corbyn did in 2019, due to the Tory’s vote more than halving and the divided nature of the opposition. The Lib Dems got their best ever result in terms of seats (72) despite their vote also halving. The combined vote of the Reform, Lib Dems, Scots Nationalists and Greens was greater than Labour’s, but they only got 90 seats compared to Labour’s 411.

Far from celebrating a “Brexit Dividend” Labour have set about making all the hard decisions early while there is still some chance of blaming the Tories for the resultant austerity, but the structural problems of the UK economy remain to be tackled. One of the things which shocked me about the UK’s Brexit strategy was the focus on trade in manufactured goods, when services make up 70% of the UK economy. Having been the financial services capital of the EU, London is rapidly slipping down the list of financial centres world-wide.

—oo0oo—

Sinn Féin consolidated their position as the largest party in local, Assembly and Westminster seats in Northern Ireland, increasing their vote by 4.2%, making their marginal seats safe, and coming within 179 votes of taking East Londonderry.

The DUP, on the other hand lost 8.5% of the vote resulting in three seat losses to Alliance, the TUV and UUP, and much reduced majorities everywhere else. Three of its remaining seats – Belfast East, East Antrim, and East Londonderry are now marginal, and their majorities in Strangford and Upper Bann are much reduced.

The Alliance vote declined by 1.8% and resulted in one seat loss and one gain – with Sorcha Eastwood taking advantage of the DUP’s travails post Donaldson. The UUP’s Robin Swann had a clear win in East Antrim while the SDLP retained its two seats in Foyle and South Belfast with reduced majorities.

The TUV’s Jim Allister had a narrow win over Ian Paisley Jnr. in North Antrim while ex-DUP independent Alex Easton had an easy win over Alliance’s Stephen Farry. Alliance have yet to retain any seat they have won and need to get better at building local organisations and doing the nitty gritty constituency work vital to consolidating swing support.

—oo0oo—

In contrast, Sinn Féin lost their momentum in the south where a widespread narrative (not shared by this author) had been that they would almost inevitably lead the next government. Having been riding high in the polls with up to 35% support as recently as 2022, 2024 was the year that the Sinn Féin bubble burst even if there was a lack of enthusiasm for how FF and FG were running the country.

Sinn Féin’s share of the vote came in at 12% in the local elections and 19% in the general election although it should be noted that the long term decline in FF and FG’s share of the vote continued despite the record low turnout probably favouring their older demographic support bases. Indeed, record low turnouts was a feature of all recent elections in the UK and Ireland and probably represents an alienation from the political process by younger voters in particular.

The result will probably end up being another FF/FG led coalition with some friendly and ideologically compatible independents replacing the Greens and making up the numbers to give the government an overall majority. FF/FG only need two additional seats to achieve an overall majority but will probably try to secure a few more independents to guard against defections and bye-election losses. The Green vote halved and Labour, the Social Democrats, Aontú and independents did well, although it was noticeable that no representative of the hard right was elected, with most getting derisory votes.

—oo0oo—

So, what are the main risks and opportunities for Ireland and Northern Ireland in 2025?

1. UK public service cuts could have a disproportionately large impact on the NI economy as so much of it is dependent on the public sector. NI agriculture will also struggle to compete with its EU funded southern counterparts.
2. Divergence in pay rates north and south resulting in a “brain drain” of professional talent from the north to the south could cause further public service deficits in Northern Ireland.
3. Lulled into a false sense of security by the extraordinary €25 Billion plus budget surplus for 2024 the Irish government could enter into a lot of ongoing spending commitments which are not sustainable in the longer term, especially if the Trump risks come to fruition or when the next recession comes along. This could have a knock on impact on Northern Ireland, where trade with the south is booming.
4. The EU could become less cohesive as a Union if differing responses to Russian aggression and US attempts at divide and conquer succeed in disrupting decision making. Poor productivity growth, low investment, and poor levels of innovation and entrepreneurship as identified in the Draghi report could undermine living standards and political stability going forward if not addressed more effectively.
5. Immigration pressures will likely continue with the population explosion in Africa and widespread conflict in the Middle East. A coherent, effective, and united EU response is required. There is no obligation in international law for any country or Union to accept unlimited numbers of  migrants, no matter how difficult the conditions in their home countries. A greater effort to achieve peace in the Middle East and economic development in Africa is required.
6. Climate change continues apace, but so does the expansion of solar power which is cheap and not reliant on imports from abroad. There are belated signs that Ireland will catch up on optimising its wind power opportunity and increasing inter-country grid connections will make intermittency less of an issue.

It would be remiss of me not to mention yesterday’s historic 48-36 vote in the Assembly consenting to the continued operation of the Windsor Framework. It marked the first time any devolved Assembly has been given a formal role in deciding the fate of an international trade treaty, a matter normally reserved for Westminster. I will not relitigate the arguments here beyond highlighting Obelisk’s excellent discussion of the issues. The vote broadly reflected the Remain/Leave divide in Northern Ireland politics, only this time the majority view prevailed, as it will in any future border poll. The unionist veto is no longer absolute.

For all the dark clouds on the horizon, I remain an incurable optimist. We are all shaped by our family histories and many far greater difficulties have been overcome in the past. Europe was more united than ever over Brexit and (bar Hungary) is shaping up to have a more united and coherent response to Putin’s aggression in the future. The pace of innovation and entrepreneurship may be disappointing in almost all EU countries, but rapid GDP growth is not to be expected or required in countries with aging and declining populations. Right wing nationalist parties may be doing well in European elections, but few actually advocate for leaving the EU. With the world becoming ever more  hostile and unstable, more and more sceptics may come to see value in the mutual cooperation, stability, and security offered by a European Union.