The Resurgence of Democratic Deficiencies: Once More onto the Breach…

Described as “a great big gaping hole where public engagement with political processes should be”,^[1] the term ‘democratic deficit’ gained currency in the UK following the introduction of the Local Government Act (1992).^[2] This Act established the Local Government Commission for England (LGC), which was tasked with conducting a comprehensive review of local government. The LGC’s initial recommendations included reducing the number of locally elected councillors. This coincided with a reduced presence of councillors on the boards of public bodies, such as District Health Authorities, which were replaced by ministerial appointees.^[3] The result was a decline in representative local input into important areas of governmental decision-making, leading to a democratic deficit.

Recent political developments have led to a revival of the concept of a democratic deficit. Following Donald Trump’s election in 2016, an essay in the University of Chicago Law Review titled ‘Democracy’s Deficits’ described his victory and the UK’s Brexit vote that same year as “dramatic moments in a populist uprising against the postwar political consensus of liberal rule”.^[4] For the author of the essay, the Brexit referendum highlighted a growing distrust in democratic institutions and traditional political processes. This reflected broader challenges to democracy’s legitimacy, where established institutions are bypassed, undermining its claim as the superior form of governance.

Since its inception, the European Union (EU) has faced numerous challenges to its democratic legitimacy.^[5] It has been accused of lacking transparency, which prevents its citizens from understanding and engaging in decision-making, a factor that may account for the exceptionally low voter turnout at European Parliament elections. Furthermore, the European Commission has exclusive power to propose laws but is entirely appointed rather than being elected, lacking any direct democratic legitimacy. In 2008, the EU attempted to tackle this problem with the Lisbon Treaty, which Ireland initially rejected but accepted the following year. The express purpose of this reform was to enshrine the three fundamental principles of “democratic equality, representative democracy and participatory democracy”, addressing the EU’s perceived democratic deficiency.^[6]

The question of the EU’s legitimacy arose once more during the debate about Northern Ireland’s (NI) political status following Brexit and the various iterations of the NI Protocol.^[7] One side argues that the Protocol threatens NI’s constitutional position within the UK and objects to EU laws applying in NI without democratic input. They also express concerns about creating trade barriers between NI and Great Britain (GB). Supporters of the current arrangements view them as a necessary adaptation to NI’s unique circumstances, offering economic advantages through access to both UK and EU markets while protecting the Good Friday Agreement.^[8]

Changes to NI’s trading arrangements with GB can be approved by a simple majority of the Assembly without ‘cross-community support’, but this would not create a democratic deficit as traditionally defined. While debates about democratic deficits often focus on high-level constitutional arrangements like the NI Protocol, more concrete examples of democratic deficits can be found in local governance structures, where democratic representation has been systematically reduced over time.

Local government reform in NI led to 26 councils being replaced by 11 ‘super councils’ on 1 April 2015. However, several functions previously delivered by the NI Executive departments were transferred to councils, most notably planning. This shake-up also ended ‘double jobbing’, which allowed MLAs, MPs, and MEPs to serve as councillors concurrently. In early 2011, the Northern Ireland Local Government Association (NILGA) contacted the Belfast City Council (BCC) following “concerns voiced by some of its members over the last number of months in regard to their lack of involvement in important decisions, particularly as a result of the absence or reduction in the numbers of elected Members who sit on public bodies”.^[9]

NILGA presented a paper to BCC’s Pre April-2015 Strategic Policy and Resources Committee titled ‘Losing Democracy? An exploration of the relationship between central and local government’,^[10] in which it set out the case that:

a lack of democratic representation on Non-Departmental Public Bodies reduces the accountability of the bodies and that it is important that decisions about public services and public money are taken as close as possible to local people and local communities by those who have been elected to represent them.^[11]

In 2009, the NI Executive had sponsored 78 public bodies, of which 14 had elected members on their boards, comprising 96 councillors. At the time of writing their report, NILGA counted only 63 locally elected representatives remaining in these positions, a reduction of 34.38%.

The number of locally elected councillors on the boards of some non-departmental public bodies has remained relatively consistent. One such board is the Drainage Council for Northern Ireland (DCNI), which is constituted under the Drainage (NI) Order 1973. This states that ten local councillors should sit on the DCNI board and that their tenure is conditional on continued council membership.^[12] On the other hand, the board of the Northern Ireland Fire and Rescue Services (NIFRS) currently has only four members who are elected councillors,^[13] whereas previously it had eight,^[14] a reduction of 50%.

Historically, the five Education and Library Boards (ELBs) had 70 councillors, which was by far the largest number of elected representatives providing scrutiny and strategic direction in any area of governance in NI. However, in 2011, as the ELBs transitioned towards amalgamation, it was unclear how many councillors remained on their boards. With the new Education Authority (EA) becoming operational on 1 April 2015, as set out in the provisions of the Education Act (Northern Ireland) 2014, the composition of its board is now clear.^[15] It consists of 20 members plus a Chair:

• 8 political members who were nominated by political parties according to the D’Hondt mechanism
• 4 members representative of the interests of the Transferors (the 3 main Protestant churches) of Controlled schools
• 4 members representative of the interests of the Trustees of Catholic Maintained schools
• 1 member representative of the interests of Integrated schools
• 1 member representative of the interests of Irish medium schools
• 1 member representative of the interests of Voluntary Grammar schools
• 1 member representative of the interests of Controlled Grammar schools

However, closer examination reveals that only three of the eight ‘political members’ on the current EA board are elected representatives. Compared to historic ELB numbers, this is a reduction of 95.71%.

The near-total absence of representative grassroots input and accountability in educational governance across NI illustrates a definitive democratic deficit. This is particularly significant for the EA’s recently announced ‘RAISE Programme’- a £20 million ‘Shared Island Fund’ initiative responding to the ‘Fair Start’ report on educational underachievement. While RAISE will be regionally based and community-informed across 15 localities, it replaces councillor expertise with appointed Locality Coordinators.

This structural democratic deficit has three critical implications:

First, reducing ELB councillor representation from 70 to just three EA board members resulted in a significant loss of local knowledge and democratic accountability. While Locality Coordinators may possess professional expertise, they lack the democratic mandate and community connections of elected representatives.

Second, without strong democratic representation, decisions about resource allocation and programme priorities risk failing to reflect local needs. The removal of councillors’ traditional role as community bridges may allow for a gap between policy and implementation.

Third, the lack of democratic oversight may undermine the programme’s legitimacy in communities with the highest levels of educational underachievement, where success depends on local engagement traditionally facilitated by elected representatives.

While the RAISE Programme’s objectives are admirable, its effectiveness may be limited by the democratic deficit it seeks to address through a community-informed approach. This raises questions about how to achieve genuine community involvement in tackling educational underachievement without restoring traditional democratic structures. Fortunately, education is a devolved matter, unlike Brexit, which should make implementing solutions relatively straightforward.

An improved model for the EA is the one currently used by the Northern Ireland Housing Executive (NIHE).^[16] The NIHE board consists of ten members, four of whom are locally elected councillors, a substantial reduction (33.33%) from the six who historically occupied these reserved positions. Significantly, however, these four elected representatives are drawn from the Housing Council, a body made up of one representative from each of NI’s eleven local councils.^[17] It serves as a consultative and advisory forum where local councillors can discuss a wide range of housing issues. It considers issues referred by the Department for Communities or the NIHE, along with other relevant housing matters it deems significant. The Housing Council can make recommendations to both bodies.

This model could be adapted for educational governance. An Education Council (EC), consisting of a representative from each of NI’s eleven local councils, could serve as a forum for discussing educational matters affecting their areas. Like the Housing Council, it could consider issues referred by the Department of Education (DE) or the EA while also identifying local educational priorities. Such a body could nominate elected councillors to the EA board, ensuring democratic representation while maintaining the link between local communities and strategic decision-making. This would be particularly valuable for initiatives like the RAISE Programme, where local knowledge and community engagement are recognised as crucial for success. The EC could provide democratic oversight of resource allocation and help ensure that future incentives aimed at reducing academic underachievement accurately reflect local needs and circumstances.

1. https://www.mytutor.co.uk/answers/10553/A-Level/Government-and-Politics/What-exactly-is-a-democratic-deficit/ ↑
2. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1992/19/part/II/enacted ↑
3. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/03003939408433722 ↑
4. https://lawreview.uchicago.edu/print-archive/democracys-deficits ↑
5. https://www.civitas.org.uk/eu-facts/eu-overview/democracy-in-the-eu/ ↑
6. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/fiches_techniques/2013/010105/04A_FT(2013)010105_EN.pdf ↑
7. https://www.qub.ac.uk/sites/post-brexit-governance-ni/ProjectPublications/Explainers/; https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9548/ ↑
8. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cgr029lq1yeo#comments ↑
9. https://minutes.belfastcity.gov.uk/mgAi.aspx?ID=21067 ↑
10. https://minutes.belfastcity.gov.uk/documents/s32921/Appendix%201%20-%20NILGA%20Consultation.pdf ↑
11. https://minutes.belfastcity.gov.uk/mgAi.aspx?ID=21067 ↑
12. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/nisi/1973/69 ↑
13. https://www.nifrs.org/home/about-us/nifrs-board/ ↑
14. https://minutes.belfastcity.gov.uk/documents/s32921/Appendix%201%20-%20NILGA%20Consultation.pdf ↑
15. https://www.eani.org.uk/about-us/education-authority-board ↑
16. https://www.nihe.gov.uk/getattachment/d012871d-614f-4c66-89f7-4974f12e6363/Board-and-Independent-Committee-Appointments-Terms.pdf ↑
17. https://nihousingcouncil.org/about-the-nihc/council-members/ ↑

David Bell

David is an ex-Orangefield Boys’ School pupil, a retired teacher, lecturer and academic. He represents Titanic on Belfast City Council for the Alliance Party, is a Governor at two East Belfast Primary Schools, studies Human Rights law at Ulster University and is a member of Humanists UK. He writes in an entirely personal capacity.