While you’re waiting for election results, why not take a look at the state of Brexit from the Irish point of view?

Fairly dramatic conclusions about the future of the Union and stability in Northern Ireland have been produced in the third Brexit Status Report of the Dublin based Institute of European and International Affairs.    Rather disappointingly the Report avoids discussing post Brexit  strategies for restoring  Stormont or if they fail, options such as direct rule, joint authority or an accountability mechanism for the Northern Ireland people on the future of the “frontstop,” assuming it is ratified by Parliament. A border poll would be “premature”. Referendums on the constitutional future would require much informed debate and better relations with unionists.

In the section on the Republic’s economy the impact of Brexit has not been as severe as might have been expected. Irish exasperation with the British “not knowing what they want” over Brexit is of course very marked.  We could have done with a little more about the impact on the NI economy. In the following extracts from the nearly 200 pages, I’ve concentrated on the political aspects, though not exclusively. Best to read the whole thing.

 

Foreword

Two conclusions stand out. The first is that Brexit is an English problem and the “United Kingdom”, in place since 1707, has been sundered. Irrespective of the future relationship between England and Wales on the one hand and Scotland on the other, it is clear that Scotland will be doing its own thing from now on either as an independent state or in some new form of association with England and Wales. All the forces in play are expertly analysed in Chapter 10 and point to the emergence of some new political arrangement between the two entities.

This will have a major psychological and, therefore, political impact on the Unionist community in the North. The implications for Northern Ireland, always the major preoccupation of this project, are analysed in Chapter 12, as are those for the Republic in Section Four.

Which brings us to the second conclusion. Even after three years of debate (if the raucous exchanges in the House of Commons can be called that) the English body politic is as far away as ever from agreement on what it wants from Europe. The spectrum of possibilities range from the closest possible alignment of the two economies centred around membership of the Customs Union and alignment with the Single Market (the status quo in all but name) to a complete rejection of a customs union and its restrictions on the UK’s freedom to negotiate new trade deals and regulatory equivalence within the Single Market and the creation instead of what has been dubbed “Singapore on the Thames”. In short, the freedom to have one’s cake and to eat it, or to pick and choose at will, a familiar formula which has to be taken with increasing seriousness….

The challenge ahead is how to handle the fall-out from the North without any reversion to past chaos on the security and economic fronts. In that regard, the chapters on Northern Ireland are particularly helpful and leave no doubt as to the potential for a breakdown in law and order and economic stability. They further indicate that Irish policy-makers will have to fashion a way forward that can calm Unionist fears while simultaneously reassuring Nationalists that the benefits of the Belfast/Good Friday agreement will be maintained – no easy task but one within reach if the mastery of events is maintained by the Government, Oireachtas and public service.

On Northern Ireland by Katy Hayward of QUB

Protecting the 1998 Agreement remains a challenge into the future UK-EU relationship – it is not a task that can be indefinitely secured by any Withdrawal Agreement.

Northern Ireland faces the challenge of having harder borders to the east and to the south of it post-Brexit – a situation which brings economic and political risks. Making sure that the economic consequences of Northern Ireland’s unique position post-Brexit move in a positive rather than negative direction will require yet more flexibility from the EU and UK.

The mobilisation of new voices in the public sphere in Northern Ireland has been a welcome consequence of the Brexit process and needs to be built upon.

The 1998 Agreement is under pressure…  This does not mean that the 1998 Agreement cannot survive Brexit, but it does mean that there is a need to actively – and collaboratively – protect and preserve its achievements into the post-Brexit period.

Secondly, the relationship between the Republic of Ireland and Great Britain has changed – with enormous ramifications for Northern Ireland. The Irish Government’s efforts to educate other Member States of the EU about the peace process and the 1998 Agreement must go down as one of the most remarkable and successful efforts of diplomacy in the twenty-first century. (This reading is disputed by some Conservatives and unionists who argue that the EU element in the GFA and  the security threat are exaggerated to big up an argument for Irish unity and that the NI protocol’s role for the Assembly is in breach of the unionist right of self determination.

The third key effect of Brexit that is already evident is that it has placed the union of the UK under remarkable strain. This is in part because it has added another layer to existing fundamental differences within the union (i.e. Scotland and Northern Ireland voting to Remain). But it is also because it has exposed a persistent myopia within England when it comes to the union. Against a background of growing indifference from Great Britain and a rising pressure for independence in Scotland, unionists in Northern Ireland are also having to deal with the perception of growing momentum among nationalists closer to home. This impression is cultivated by the fact that Sinn Féin is quite happy with Boris Johnson’s deal; if republicans are happy, then the natural assumption is that loyalists should be uneasy…

Although an increasing number of opinion polls that appear to indicate growing support for Irish unity in Northern Ireland, the most reliable data would indicate a more nuanced picture. Catholic respondents have never been as predominantly nationalist or prounification as Protestants have been so predominantly unionist and pro-union. The fact that more Catholics are saying that they are in favour of Irish unification is far from a sign of an imminent majority for a border poll. Support for Irish unity is conditional, e.g. it grows in the imagined scenario of an Irish hard border postBrexit, or of Scottish independence. Moreover, Catholics’ willingness to see Northern Ireland continue in the UK has been largely conditional on the full operation of the 1998 Agreement. The failure of the devolved institutions to function properly since early 2017 has been as important as Brexit in affecting people’s views on Irish unity…

If the Withdrawal Agreement is voted through in its current form, Northern Ireland can expect to have harder borders all around. The Irish border will be a harder border for the movement of people (i.e. non-British and non-Irish citizens), services and capital. The significance of this is often overlooked. Northern Ireland sells about £2 billion in services exports; £1.2 billion of which goes to the EU, and over 75% of those EU sales are to Ireland. The vast majority of businesses involved in that cross-border services trade are small/ micro businesses who will struggle with increased restrictions on their trade. The movement of goods across the Irish Sea will also become more burdensome. Although this is far from a matter of constitutional significance, making sure that the economic consequences of Northern Ireland’s unique position postBrexit move in a positive rather than negative direction will require yet more flexibility. It will also require leadership in Northern Ireland that has confidence in the Irish and British governments, both of which will have to adjust to the new situation in the region. In light of the impact of Brexit so far on Northern Ireland, we can expect future challenges to be even more acute.

Economic consequences for Ireland. By Dan O’Brien

The economies of Ireland and the UK are highly integrated. Goods and services, capital and labour, and more recently data, flow in large volumes between the two economies… However, to date the economic impact of the UK’s decision to leave the EU has been limited if not marginal for the Irish economy. In the final months of 2019 Irish growth rates – of both output and employment – remain among the highest in the developed world, as they have been quite consistently for over half a decade, both before and after the UK’s Brexit referendum. The most marked economic impact from the UK’s 2016 referendum of relevance to Ireland was a significant depreciation in the value of sterling vis a vis the euro… Even in the event of a solid majority for one party, uncertainty around Brexit is likely to continue given the commitments and absence of clarity on significant issues by both major parties. This can be expected to have some negative impact on the Irish economy, although, as the past three and a half years have shown, other sources of growth are likely to far offset any further Brexit drag effect.

 

The Withdrawal Agreement and the Northern Ireland Protocol, by John Temple Lang

The Withdrawal Agreement was and is intended to be temporary, until a long-term agreement is made between the EU and the UK. The version of the Agreement agreed by the May government was on the basis that the UK would remain in the EU Customs Union and the EU Single Market. The Agreement therefore included many provisions corresponding to the EU rules on both subjects. However, the Political Declaration now says that the Boris Johnson Government does not intend that the UK will remain in either the EU Customs Union or the EU Single Market. So, the basis of the future relationship will be entirely different, and many of the provisions of the Agreement will no longer be relevant in the longer term. The Johnson Government hopes to make bilateral trade agreements with countries all over the world. It intends to have tariff- and quota-free trade with the EU, but it has weakened the assurances given in the Political Declaration envisaging aligned rules in a ‘level playing field’ regulatory regime. It seems that the Johnson Government envisages an EU-UK agreement that will be little more than the EU-Canada agreement ruling out tariffs and quotas.

One key issue will be the constraints imposed on State aid given by UK authorities (including regional authorities): there is little point in prohibiting tariffs if there is no effective control over State aid. The Protocol treats Northern Ireland differently. Formally Northern Ireland will be in the UK customs area, and will of course export freely to the rest of the UK. Direct trade between the Republic of Ireland and the EU, on the one hand, and Britain on the other, will be governed, in due course, by the future EU-UK trade arrangements. No tariffs will be imposed on exports from the Republic of Ireland into Northern Ireland, and products originating in Northern Ireland will not be subject to tariffs on entering the rest of Ireland or the EU.

For some other purposes, Northern Ireland will be treated as if it were part of the EU Customs Union. This is the result of having customs at Northern Ireland ports at which goods entering Northern Ireland from Britain will be checked by the UK authorities on behalf of the EU. (Johnson says at different times, some checks or no checks: Whitehall disagrees).    If the goods are likely to be exported into the Republic of Ireland or the rest of the EU, they will pay, on entering Northern Ireland, whatever tariffs are required by EU law. If they are not “at risk” of going into the Republic of Ireland, they will pay no EU tariffs.  Goods will be regarded as being “at risk”, that is, likely to enter the Republic, unless they comply with requirements to be drawn up by a Joint Committee, and will not be commercially processed. In other words, goods entering Northern Ireland that are likely to move into the Republic will be treated, on entering Northern Ireland, as if they were entering the EU. Goods considered sufficiently likely to remain in Northern Ireland will bear only the tariffs appropriate to entry into the UK, if these have not already been paid. Northern Ireland will also be, in effect, in the EU Single Market for goods. This is the result of the Protocol provisions that require Northern Ireland law to include a large number of EU internal market rules. On this basis, goods complying with Northern Ireland law (include EU provisions) can be exported freely into the Republic of Ireland and the rest of the EU. The EU provisions in question are those dealing with goods, sanitary rules for veterinary controls, rules on agricultural production and marketing, value added tax and excise duties, and State aid rules (Protocol, Annex 2). So far, very little has been said about services.

Importantly, the Protocol provides that the EU institutions shall, in relation to the UK, exercise the powers given to them by EU law The EU Court of Justice will have the jurisdiction provided by the EU Treaties in connection with the Single Market measures applying in Northern Ireland, under Article 267 TFEU.

It is difficult and unsatisfactory to negotiate with people who do not know what they want and are not agreed among themselves. The most difficult negotiations, on the long-term EU-UK relations, have not yet begun.

Implications for Ireland of the future UK-EU relationship by Bill Emmott, a former editor of The Economist

The approximately 18 months from December 2017 until summer 2019 put the Irish border at the centre of the debate, and resulted in the worst period in Anglo-Irish relations for several decades. But the new Withdrawal Agreement, treating Northern Ireland as a special case, eases the pressure considerably. The UK general election opens up the possibility of a wide range of outcomes that would have implications for Ireland, including a new ‘crash-out’ potential at the end of 2020, a return to an immediate ‘no deal’, a new referendum, and an orderly move to negotiations over the future UK-EU relationship. Under the continuity scenario of the parliamentary ratification of Boris Johnson’s Withdrawal Agreement, the likeliest implication for Ireland will arise from a UK move to the deregulation of favoured sectors, diverging from previous ‘level playing field’ assumptions..

Short term perspectives by Donal de Buitléir.

It will be very important for both Governments to set up alternative meeting arrangements particularly when it comes to Northern Ireland. However, these can never replicate the frequent, routine and relaxed environment for contact and conversation in the margin of EU meetings. Both Governments will struggle to maintain the warmth of their pre-Brexit relationship. One useful structure would be regular (perhaps every six months) meetings organised by the relevant Cabinet Secretariat of Ministers and senior officials of the key Government Departments such as Taoiseach, Foreign Affairs, Finance and Justice with others as required. These meetings should focus on Northern Ireland issues. North-South Relations between the unionist community (particularly the Democratic Unionist Party) and the Irish Government have been damaged by the Brexit process…

Some in the Unionist community fear that a Border poll may be imminent. While the Irish Government has been at pains to suggest that this would be entirely premature, the fear has not been entirely assuaged. Much work needs to be done to restore amicable working relations between the Irish Government and the Unionist community. The great lesson from the UK referendum is the need to have an informed debate before issues are put to people in a referendum. Academics and others need to give serious consideration to the issues that would have to be considered if a Border poll was triggered. These include the economic implications, the governance structures and the protections for minorities that would be essential. In particular, the simplistic notion that all that would be required is a takeover by the South of the North, without major changes on both sides, needs to be challenged.

Northern Ireland

Following the collapse of the Northern Ireland Executive on 16 January 2017, the Northern Ireland Civil Service (NICS) has been responsible for the day-today running of the country. Senior officials have continued to carry out departmental functions and run public services, operating within the scope of the policy direction set by ministers before the collapse.

This has created a vacuum. Important matters have been neglected. Decisions cannot be made which impact on health, education and other essential public services. Westminster has legislated occasionally in devolved areas, but only when unavoidable – to pass budgets, set essential rates and extend the period for executive formation – and often at the last minute. More substantive policy changes, namely those on same-sex marriage and abortion, have been the result of backbench amendments rather than UK Government strategy. Some of the consequences of such a prolonged period of governing without ministers are as follows:

• As civil servants are unable to develop new policy and change policy direction, no progress can be made on the long-term public service reforms necessary to run Northern Ireland efficiently. David Sterling, head of the NICS, warned of the risk of “stagnation and decay”

. • The North South Ministerial Council is not able to meet, meaning that opportunities for cross border working, particularly on Brexit, have been missed.

• In the absence of ministers and a sitting Assembly, there are few mechanisms in place to hold civil servants to account and scrutinise decision making.

To deal with this situation, the UK and Irish Governments must redouble their efforts to restore durable and sustainable government in Northern Ireland. But more is needed. Northern Ireland lacks a vibrant policy community – although as a consequence of Brexit, civil society groups have become increasingly vocal. Future government and civil society should build on this to reinvigorate wider policy engagement across Northern Ireland and facilitate greater interchange with other parts of the UK and with Ireland. The establishment of Pivotal40, a new public policy think tank for Northern Ireland, in September 2019 provides an important opportunity.

Pivotal aims to help Northern Ireland prosper by encouraging better public policy and involving a wider range of people in policy debate. Pivotal aims to promote policy solutions that improve the lives of people across Northern Ireland by engaging a wider range of people in public debate and by using evidence–based research about what works to help develop better public policy. It will be important for think tanks and research institutes in Ireland to develop links with Pivotal to share experiences and research.