Anand Menon the director the UK in a Changing Europe and as near to objectivity as it gets, has been issuing correctives to the Brexit positions of both the UK government and the EU Commission. In separate articles his analyses provide sage advice for both sides after the election. Does it mean a smoother passage for all goods in both directions across the Irish Sea?
In the Guardian yesterday, with Catharine Barnard
Get Brexit done….” The simple answer is that it’s profoundly misleading. Let’s assume – and it’s quite an assumption – that things go smoothly for the government. Boris Johnson’s electoral gamble pays off. He comes back on 13 December at the head of a majority government. At that point, he may still struggle to “bang Brexit through” by Christmas because parliament resumes sitting only on 17 December, and then there is the small matter of swearing in 650 MPs, and a Queen’s speech and subsequent debate. However, with a majority, he should be able to pass his withdrawal agreement bill in order that the UK finally leaves the European Union on 31 January..
Researchers at the Institute for Government have provided a good guide as to how long these negotiations typically take (about four years). To summarise, when you look at recent free-trade agreements signed by the European Union, it becomes clear that an 11-month transition period is simply too short to allow for negotiation.
It is true that the time it takes to negotiate a deal will hinge on what kind of deal the parties want. Michel Barnier, the EU’s chief negotiator, has accepted that a “basic free-trade deal” could possibly be negotiated by the end of next year. Yet this raises numerous questions. For one thing, a basic deal on tariffs would risk falling foul of EU member states worried about the danger of Britain having tariff-free access to the EU market but able to cut standards, including workers’ rights. For another, the government has repeatedly claimed it is seeking a “best-in-class” trade deal. One can only wonder what kind of class it has in mind.
And the UK has a major interest in a much broader trade deal, covering services and internal security matters, such as access to EU databases, which have proved essential for combatting international crime. All of this points to the UK wanting a much more substantial and wider-ranging trade deal than the basic model. And this will take time – maybe years…
In the FT today – Menon makes striking criticisms of the EU’s tactics over Theresa May’s three abortive agreements, where Europhiles pinned most of the blame for failure on the British. Does this suggest a more flexible approach to the final settlement and a real mitigation of all those checks and regulations between GB and NI – and the Republic for that matter? Menon argues: An inflexible Brussels is damaging its own interests over Brexit
Consider the supposed legal constraints. The UK, so the EU argument goes, has to choose between a Norway-style deal inside the single market and a free trade agreement, without options in between. Michel Barnier, EU negotiator, suggested (incredibly) that allowing selective UK access would mean “the end of the single market and the European project”. I have no idea what causal reasoning lies behind this claim but, as Professor Stephen Weatherill points out, “the indivisibility of the freedoms is a political construct: the legal reality is already more messy.” ..
Consider how the EU handled Theresa May’s Chequers proposals. Within a fortnight, Mr Barnier was reported to have rejected them. By the end of the month he openly criticised the then prime minister’s plan. Then came her Salzburg humiliation. The EU abjectly failed to recognise how far Mrs May had moved. The fact that it cost her two of her most senior ministers ought to have provided a sign. An internal EU document set out unconvincing objections to Chequers: its core claim was that the UK could gain an “unfair competitive advantage”. A series of rather aged economic studies were paraded but no impact assessment was commissioned. And the arguments were flawed. The May government had signed up to the level playing field conditions to prevent unfair competition. Moreover, the EU separates goods from services in its deals with all other countries and there is no complete level playing field when it comes to services, even within the EU.
Perhaps Brussels was holding out to ensure a softer Brexit. What did they expect after the Salzburg debacle? That the House of Commons would magically discover a majority for a referendum? That Jeremy Corbyn, Labour leader, would ride to the rescue? That a Remainer would succeed Mrs May at the Tory party’s helm? The reality has been more predictable and more damaging to EU interests. Boris Johnson has set the UK on a path towards a far looser relationship with the EU. Neither side emerges with flying colours. But the notion that a flawed UK made unreasonable demands on a rationalist, legally constrained EU does not fly. This is worth reflecting on as the negotiations move towards their second — and more important — phase.
I look forward to the response from our local EU experts, David Phinnemore and Katy Hayward.
Former BBC journalist and manager in Belfast, Manchester and London, Editor Spolight; Political Editor BBC NI; Current Affairs Commissioning editor BBC Radio 4; Editor Political and Parliamentary Programmes, BBC Westminster; former London Editor Belfast Telegraph. Hon Senior Research Fellow, The Constitution Unit, Univ Coll. London
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