E-voting machines successfully hacked…

More bad news for the Republic’s plans for e-voting..


  • Green Ink

    A rigged election would certainly increase Fianna Fail’s chances of getting into government next time.

  • Crataegus

    “Both ICTE and the Dutch group have reiterated their view that no voting system should be introduced which lacks a voter-verified audit trail.”

    Seems common sense but I would also be concerned that if you have an audit trail you also have potential for storage and abuse of information. Perhaps we should stick to the paper system and retain all the hacks and tally men.

  • At least if there are two independent systems, and a meaningful recount can be held, then it is POSSIBLE to verify the electronic results. Without that, the results are IMPOSSIBLE to verify.

    Equivalent issues in the US are highlighted on the Electronic Frontier Foundation site.

    Bruce Schneier, an expert in computer security has an interesting article here.

    Perhaps a good approach is to have an “open source” system, with appropriate manual safeguards and voter verification, that can be checked in public, and in which people can have confidence. Not some squalid private organisation trying to cut costs (or worse) with secretive and corner-cutting practices.

  • eranu

    is there really a need to use a specifically designed machine to cast a vote?
    we use our web browsers for bank transactions, and credit card payments. the secure connection provided by SSL, and other encryption technologies, is considered safe enough for billions of pounds to be transfered electronically.
    surely all thats needed is a secure web site that you can register on and get a username and password. then you can login and cast your vote. you can even get a confirmation email with a unique generated ID if needed. to provide a trail, the web server could record what party each generated ID voted for. you could then login to the site and check your ID was recorded against the right party. it would still be anonymous as no names would be recorded. every voter could then verify the election results.

  • Holt

    eranu has some interesting ideas but they also contain some flaws

    1. There is proof of how you voted, hence an oppertunity to ‘sell’ votes. Remember a ballot paper with any marks other than the preference selected, which might serve to identify the voter is deemed invalid, – a condition specifically introduced to stop vote selling.

    2. Would I have any real proof (other than an email which after all is produced by program) that the vote that I cast is actually recorded against the ID number in the email. (If the software used is published and there is a way of guarenteeing that the software used is identical to the software published, this may constitute proof – but it is a complex area)

    3. What happens if I (genuinely, maliciously or otherwise) dispute the record displayed against the number given.

  • Puzzled Jackeen

    The voter-verified audit trail doesn’t have to record anything other than the preferences for candidates – it shouldn’t record who voted which way, for example. It could be simply a list of preferences printed as soon as the person who voted presses the button that says they are satisfied with it – this printout is stored inside the machin in a locked box until the time comes to count votes or challenge the result.