Unionism: the underlying reality?

Alex Kane believes that given the hetrogenious nature of New DUP, the party may have to come to terms with the apparently rapid progress of the last two years cannot be relied on to continue.

By Alex Kane

The DUP has become the largest party in Northern Ireland by attracting more votes than any other party. Self-evidently true, you are thinking to yourselves, and hardly the most profound piece of political analysis. But, like many other self-evident truths, all is not as straight-forward as it first appears.

I make the observation because I believe that the DUP’s strategists are over-estimating their ability to forge ahead as an unstoppable electoral and political machine. It’s all very well to talk about challenging the UUP for every seat, but it’s quite another matter to sustain the present momentum, meet conflicting demands, and deliver what seem to be different promises to different interest groups.

While it is true that the DUP has successfully attracted tens of thousands of new votes, it is equally true that these voters are not an homogenous body; they have come at different times, with different baggage and slightly differing agendas. Indeed, the DUP seems to be becoming an umbrella group, sheltering an array of pro-Union factions. That, as the UUC discovered to its cost, could bring problems further down the line.

So, let’s take a look at some of these component parts. In the late 1990s the DUP gained former UUP supporters who opposed the Belfast Agreement and imagined the DUP to be the best vehicle for their protest. By 2003, the party was picking up votes from the UKUP, the NIUP, and the ragbag of independents who had won seats in the first Assembly. In other words, the DUP has marketed itself in such a way that its appeal to anti-Agreement unionists has remained fairly strong. Again, hardly surprising, bearing in mind that there is a wing of the DUP—let’s call it the fundamentalist wing—which remains implacably opposed to the Belfast Agreement in its present form.

Yet it is clear that there is also a pragmatic wing of the DUP, a wing which has accepted that it is probably impossible to exclude Sinn Fein from the process, or to do much more than tinker and tweak the present Agreement. This wing has proved attractive to those UUP supporters who believe that David Trimble has been a weak and inconsistent negotiator, but who would not vote for the DUP if its manifesto amounted to little more than a wreckers’ charter.

The DUP has also attracted some other elements; including former UUP supporters and members who simply hate David Trimble and who are voting primarily to undermine him rather than boost Paisley. It is clear, too, that some unionists are voting DUP in the expectation that it will never produce its “Fair Deal” and that Direct Rule will remain a permanent fixture. And, finally, there are unionists voting DUP simply to destroy the UUP, a party which they believe has betrayed Ulster.

This may explain why the DUP is determined to concentrate on electoral conquest rather than delivery of alternatives to the Agreement. The difficulty—and I think that some anti-Robinson elements (a bigger faction now that Jim Allister has returned to the fold) have begun to recognize it—is that whatever policy the DUP adopts, risks the loss of some of its recently arrived votes. It also risks the sort of internal debate which did so much electoral and political damage to the UUP.

The DUP’s ability to maintain, let alone increase its lead over the UUP, will depend upon the interplay between the array of factions which now lurk within its ranks. It may soon discover that the price to be paid for becoming the largest party in Northern Ireland is an unexpectedly high one.

First published in the Newsletter on Saturday 10th July 2003

Mick Fealty

Mick is founding editor of Slugger. He has written papers on the impacts of the Internet on politics and the wider media and is a regular guest and speaking events across Ireland, the UK and Europe. Twitter: @MickFealty