Drumcree: Could the Crisis Reshape Unionist Politics?

As the Drumcree crisis intensifies, some Unionists are calling for profound political consequences, potentially including the collapse of Stormont and its institutions, whilst others are considering the bigger picture and believe that this would be a strategic mistake.

Over the weekend, the BBC reported that Carla Lockhart MP said, in relation to Stormont, that it cannot be “business as usual” and that there need to be “profound consequences”.

This follows the decision of the Secretary of State, Sir Chris Bryant, to prohibit the Orange Order parade along the Garvaghy Road, despite the earlier determination by the Parades Commission permitting a restricted parade.

However, whilst DUP leader Gavin Robinson has been strongly critical of the Secretary of State’s decision, he has stopped short of calling for Stormont’s collapse. Jon Burrows, the UUP leader, has placed greater emphasis on restraint, dialogue and preventing the crisis from escalating.

These different approaches raise questions about whether divisions could emerge within the DUP leadership or across wider Unionism.

What we may be seeing is the continued divergence between constitutional Unionism and the more traditional cultural Unionism, which I described in my previous OP, Drumcree: Perhaps Cultural Unionism and Constitutional Unionism Have Parted Company.

I defined constitutional Unionism as those whose primary concern is that Northern Ireland should remain part of the United Kingdom, whilst cultural Unionism comprises those who feel strongly connected to British identity, Protestant history, remembrance traditions, Orange traditions and other aspects of Unionist cultural inheritance.

However, I believe that at the heart of this difference may also lie contrasting attitudes towards reconciliation here in Northern Ireland. That is not to suggest that cultural Unionists or constitutional Unionists do not believe in the principle of reconciliation.

But these two groups may have different understandings of what reconciliation requires. For some, it may mean their community’s right to express its culture and customs freely without obstruction, whilst for others, it may mean recognising that the expression of one community’s traditions can sometimes cause resentment or feelings of exclusion within another community.

It is important to state that reconciliation was embedded in the founding principles of the Good Friday Agreement. It was not simply an optional extra.

Paragraph 2 of the Declaration of Support in the Good Friday Agreement states:

“We firmly dedicate ourselves to the achievement of reconciliation, tolerance, and mutual trust.”

These words were meant to be a foundation stone of our peace agreement. To dedicate ourselves to any project requires hard work and effort. It also requires determination and resilience. Perhaps this is one aspect of the Good Friday Agreement that has been lost in translation.

However, I would argue that reconciliation is not just a social objective. It could also be a crucial part of a long-term constitutional strategy for both Unionism and Nationalism.

For Unionism, securing the Union in a future border poll may require persuading some people who identify as Irish or Northern Irish that their culture and traditions would be respected and protected within the United Kingdom.

For Nationalism, it would mean persuading some of those with traditional British identities that their interests, culture and traditions would be welcomed and respected in a united Ireland.

Therefore, coming back to the main dilemma, there may be occasions when a community’s actions need to be counterintuitive. So, what does that mean in practice?

It means that Unionism may sometimes need to restrain its cultural instincts to protect its constitutional ambitions. Likewise, Nationalism may sometimes need to accommodate Unionist cultural traditions to advance its own constitutional ambitions.

So, in practical terms, how does a community or political party go about encouraging people to vote for it when they are not necessarily part of its grassroots or core constituency?

One possible way to achieve this would be to build a positive coalition of different groups and interests into a unified and cohesive constituency that translates into support at the ballot box.

This can happen at critical moments when political parties are under pressure or have been forced to rebuild after a particularly disappointing election result. They may need to reassess who their core supporters are and who might be persuaded to join their coalition.

It may also require some difficult choices. For instance, it may require them to reduce the influence of one particular group and reflect that change through their core narratives and political messaging.

In Northern Ireland, the strategic direction of a party is complicated, as it is not just based on the left-right politics that we often see at Westminster. A strategy here might also need to take account of cultural and religious differences, social conservatism, liberal values, and traditional identities and heritage.

In terms of the Unionist parties, some of the people they may wish to attract might not come from the traditional Unionist community at all. They may describe themselves as Northern Irish, Irish, British, or have arrived in Northern Ireland from elsewhere.

Therefore, demonstrating a strong commitment to reconciliation and inclusiveness could be an important part of achieving their constitutional objective.

It is also important to recognise that whilst committing to reconciliation may, in some circumstances, help a political party achieve its own constitutional goals, it is also of great benefit to our whole community, whether Unionist, Nationalist or neither.

So, we can see that reconciliation is intertwined with the relationship between culture and constitution. This is another reason why I believe it is very much part of the Drumcree and Garvaghy Road disagreements.

The current crisis highlights many of the unresolved cultural and reconciliation issues that have existed just beneath the surface for nearly 30 years since the Good Friday Agreement was signed.

I believe there are three possible political consequences of the current crisis.

1. An internal realignment within the DUP, where different factions argue over whether defending cultural traditions should take precedence over retaining Stormont and its institutions.
2. A realignment among the existing Unionist parties, particularly if the UUP makes a greater effort to appeal to people who support the Union but are uncomfortable with more confrontational approaches to cultural issues and,
3. The emergence of a new political grouping comprising people who want Northern Ireland to remain within the UK but do not identify strongly with traditional Orange or Protestant Unionism.

In the final case, such a grouping would not necessarily have to begin as a new political party. It could emerge from within existing parties or among people who feel that traditional Unionist politics no longer reflects their priorities.

None of these developments is inevitable, but the present crisis raises questions about whether the existing Unionist parties can continue to accommodate these different political instincts within the same electoral coalitions.

In closing, it should be noted that the Drumcree crisis may or may not bring down Stormont and may not result in a formal split within Unionism. However, it has exposed some important questions about the future direction of Unionist politics.

The question is whether Unionism will primarily be concerned with defending the cultural traditions of its traditional supporters, or whether it can create a broader coalition of those who support Northern Ireland remaining within the UK but do not necessarily share those cultural traditions.

Sometimes these objectives are compatible. However, on other occasions, they may require some difficult political choices. Unionist parties may decide that building a broader coalition is essential to securing enough support to preserve the Union in the long term.

There is a similar challenge for Nationalism. Those advocating Irish unity must also consider how British identities and cultural traditions could be respected and accommodated in any future constitutional settlement.

Perhaps the most important lesson from Drumcree is that reconciliation involves building relationships and creating opportunities for people from different traditions to cooperate without being required to abandon their own identities.

The critical question for our political parties is whether they are prepared to make reconciliation a central part of their constitutional strategies rather than treating it as a separate issue.