In a single summit, the British- Irish relationship has revealed its potential for delivering a better future

I’ve just returned from a trip to Waiheke, New Zealand’s Rathlin, only with sweeping golden beaches, millionaire pads and bijou vineyards with terrific wine tasting and an oyster bar. The two islands have different charms.

From my family visit to sane New Zealand, I can’t resist making a couple of Brexit points from afar.

What seems to be emerging is a joint customs procedure between GB and the island of Ireland that technically keeps NI within the UK customs territory but keeps NI in customs and regulatory alignment with the EU. If EU tariffs were higher than the UK’s,  traders would be rebated. Potentially complicated for small businesses especially but doable with a list of exemptions that  might satisfy both practical and DUP objections. The backstop in its original form would disappear.

Such a complicated arrangement would require a rebuilding of trust between all parties, the EU, the two governments and even the parties in Northern Ireland. It’s  tall order to get there within a week or so, but is perhaps in line with the last minute style that is  characteristic of both some EU agreements and indeed  the GFA.

Would  the DUP buy it? All sorts of shadows are cast over the scene by Theresa May’s failure along similar lines.

But this time, the plates are moving differently. Cracks  in pro- union solidarity which opened over May’s third meaningful vote have widened with government encouragement.

The Tory right wing have been briefing the papers that they are no longer prepared to let the NI  tail wag the UK dog. They’ve gratefully seized on overwrought speculation that Northern Ireland may join the Republic in ten years anyway. So why go to so much trouble to accommodate the DUP?

Strategically DUP support although always desirable may not be necessary for a new Deal  unless the rebel majority can get its act together for a second referendum by Saturday week.  This is by no means guaranteed.  DUP fears of No Deal should also  not be underestimated.

There is probably a majority in Parliament for any deal the EU will sign off. Right now  the momentum is undoubtedly with Johnson.

But where does Northern Ireland consent come in? Formally it may not even be necessary but seems to be thought generally desirable.

There is speculation that the approval of a restored Assembly would be needed during a transition phase of at least two years and could be achieved by simple majority without the DUP. This is wishful thinking and will not happen unless in the unlikely event they are superseded either by the UUs or by a wholesale electoral reconstruction of the Assembly. I would guess that any role for the Assembly will be advisory on a deal that will be agreed by the EU  and the sovereign governments in advance and that cross community consent will be written into the eventual international treaty to change it after a settling in period.  In practice this requires DUP consent to ensure stability.

However DUP acquiescence at Westminster  is infinitely desirable right now,  even if Johnson is prepared to risk their abstention or even opposition. What has he got to offer them?  I would guess some  influence well short of veto.

In the continued absence of the Assembly, the NI parties could – would?- be represented proportionally on thejoint UK/EU – Ireland implementation committee structure.

A  golden opportunity is also offered to revive the British- Irish components of the  GFA to monitor the new relationships and put joint pressure on the local parties to return to Stormont with proposals substantially agreed by the two governments in advance.

Going forward, the British- Irish relationship is the one that matters. The Liverpool summit dramatically demonstrated its underlying  strength and total  relevance.

By acquiescing in Johnson’s initial and now superseded plan for two borders however hedged with limits, the DUP conceded the principle of complete uniformity with GB  – even though they try to claim they never insisted on it.

The most important element of all is not about structures or laws.   It is that the DUP and unionism more widely  may have at long tortuous last  come to realise that the best way to “save the Union” is to accept some such arrangement for customs as well as regulation that at least removes the backstop and allows the local parties some say in this future. It would be implemented and sustained by British laws and British money and buttressed by Dublin guarantees. As such an arrangement requires considerable transparency and looks forward to a substantial role for the north-south ministerial Council, there is no reason to suppose it amounts to Irish unity by stealth.  In  economic terms it would give NI the best of both worlds, if as would surely be the aim, the two islands stay in broad customs and regulatory alignment in an eventual full free trade deal. No other satisfactory proposal exists.

We’ve  got  a glimpse of what a more stable future would look like. It must be tempting, even for the DUP.