This week Alex Kane, an out and out proponent of the Belfast Agreement, this week wholeheartedly agrees with one of his party’s most consistent anti-Agreement rebels, Reverend Martin Smyth that the party is spending too much time on developing rhetoric and not addressing the actual concerns of Unionists on the ground.
By Alex. Kane
For all of his reputation as an old Orange dinosaur, Martin Smyth has one of the canniest minds in local politics. I was particularly struck by a comment he made a few weeks ago: �Rather than acknowledging and addressing the fact that the majority of unionists are unhappy with the political arrangements as currently envisaged under the Agreement, the issue is just talked around and met with rhetoric, such as there is no alternative.�
Martin is right. Pro-Agreement unionists are now reduced to saying that everything would be wonderful if only SF/IRA did the decent thing. But their failure to do the decent thing—and the continuing absence of a mechanism to force them into decency—means that the pro-Agreement lobby has been robbed of the most visible manifestations of the Agreement.
In these circumstances there is little for the Trimble camp to do other than to accuse the DUP of hypocrisy, the UUP dissidents of fantasy and SF/IRA of bad faith—all of which charges are accurate. In other words, six years after the current process began, the pro-Agreement faction have little to offer but further promises. Indeed, if anything, they have actually confirmed to everyone else that SF/IRA cannot be trusted.
That said, anti-Agreement unionists are in a weak position, too. Yes, they can point to the palpable fact that the pro-Agreement wing has precious little to show for their effort and their concessions. But how will they do better? It was the failure of Molyneaux and Martin Smyth to deliver anything after the Anglo-Irish Agreement which forced Trimble into negotiations with Sinn Fein. I have no doubt that Peter Robinson and Jeffrey Donaldson will take on Sinn Fein next time round, if they have to, but they will start from a much weaker base than Trimble in the autumn of 1997.
Political circumstances have altered dramatically over the intervening years. Back then, Tony Blair and David Trimble were newly elected leaders, full of the optimism that accompanies new responsibilities. Both were reformers and risk takers and, more importantly, had a liking and respect for each other. Bertie Ahern, too, had recently come to power and had indicated a willingness to think outside the traditional box when it came to Northern Ireland and Ulster unionism.
In America, Bill Clinton, the most popular President in living memory, was also establishing a good working relationship with the new Prime Ministers in London and Dublin. Crucially, though, he had also begun to shift his position on Sinn Fein, having lifted the previous ban on their fundraising in the United States: �You can�t say we�ll talk when we�re happy, and shoot when we�re not.� Anecdotal and autobiographical evidence suggests that he applied a lot of personal pressure on Gerry Adams to persuade him of the benefits and rewards of a democratic and inclusive solution to the problem.
SF/IRA had finally acknowledged the fact that an ongoing armed struggle was taking them nowhere and had indicated to all three governments that they were now prepared to seek a political settlement which embraced unionist needs and concerns. And, on top of all of this, there was a genuine mood of private and public optimism that, at long last, an end to the troubles and turmoil could be in sight.
Historians and pundits will produce lorry loads of research and text to explain the various twists and turns of the period between July 1997 and the autumn of 2003. What is clear now, though, is that any attempt to renegotiate the Belfast Agreement will begin on very stony ground. Blair, Ahern and Trimble are all damaged goods. President Bush has little interest. Public optimism has evaporated. The various participants have lost their earlier trust and sense of purpose.
Shifting the furniture after an election, which seems doomed to produce an ineffective and inconclusive result, will not create the circumstances in which an available and viable alternative to the existing Agreement can be negotiated. What we are dealing with at the moment is the unfinished business of the original negotiations. It will never be finished by electing people who didn�t want the business negotiated in the first place. But, if that is what the electorate vote for, then they must not be surprised if a bad situation suddenly becomes very much worse.
First published in the Newsletter on Saturday October 4th
Mick is founding editor of Slugger. He has written papers on the impacts of the Internet on politics and the wider media and is a regular guest and speaking events across Ireland, the UK and Europe. Twitter: @MickFealty
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