Sunday, March 02, 2008
“The Price of Peace”
The first part of a three-part series by BBC journalist John Ware, “The Price of Price”, has just aired on Radio 4 - it’ll be repeated on Thursday at 8pm, should be available online, and is well worth listening to [it’s currently listed as Choice of the Day - direct link to RealPlayer file here]. “Dealing with Gerry” follows a similar analysis to Mary Alice Clancy’s Phd thesis noted previously in identifying the effectiveness of the stick wielded by US envoy Mitchell Reiss - and the part played by now-presidential candidate John McCain - in moving Sinn Féin’s Gerry Adams, and The Process™, forward after 9 years of prevarication as well as covering other ground as Ware’s article indicates. Next week’s part 2 focuses on Ian Paisley Snr and the DUP.
Pete Baker @ 03:01 PM
Very interesting piece.
The whole theme was suggestive of a weak British government wanting to concede much more to Sinn Féin than the Irish Government or the US.
The role of presidential hopeful John McCain in saying “enough is enough” to Gerry Adams, in 2005 after the Northern Bank robbery and the McCartney murder, was highlighted. The swiftness of decommissioning after this intervention again suggested that the very much less tolerant approach of the US produced better results than the “indulgent” (their word) approach of the UK - and Tony Blair in particular—towards SF.
Posted by on Mar 02, 2008 @ 04:11 PMwhat’s it all mean? Too deep for me
Posted by on Mar 02, 2008 @ 05:54 PM‘that there is simply no place in a democracy for a private army engaged in illegal activity.’
McCain got that right . Whether NI is a ‘normal’ democracy or still aspiring to become one is of course the question.
One wonders if Mr McCain will apply the same reasoning to another country on the far side of the world (Iraq) for the 160,000 American soldiers and the 100,000 plus ‘private army’ of subcontractors and body guards ? The Iranian President today made aa statement to the effect that ‘It’s funny that the the same people who accuse Iran of interfering in Iraq are the same people who have 160,000 troops in Iraq ?
With 3 trillion dollars in the ground already in Iraq and another 2 trillion earmarked for the next 2 years ,Mr McCain must be hoping at this stage that Obama is elected in November . At least then Mr McCains grandchildren may not have to be sold off into slavery to pay for the war adventures of the American Republicans ?
Posted by on Mar 02, 2008 @ 07:20 PMWhat jumped out to me was the level of concern over getting the SF leadership to a place they clearly wanted to be anyhow. Adams’ answer on if there was a genuine chance of a split or if raising it was a tactic seemed the most telling, almost an admission that things were being played/acted out rather than real in some instances.
Posted by on Mar 02, 2008 @ 09:38 PMMark - I agree with your assessment, including Adam’s answer. I was kind of struck by that.
Posted by on Mar 02, 2008 @ 09:48 PMSlug,
But hindsight is 20:20, I thought something completely different at the time myself.
That’s why I’m looking forward to the rest in this series, that had an excellent start, the chance to compare the stated positions then with the realities that transpired.
Posted by on Mar 02, 2008 @ 10:05 PMPete,
I think Ware did an excellent job with this programme--he contacted me last year about using my article in his forthcoming programme about the 10th anniversary of the Belfast Agreement. Bravo to Ware (and Reiss)for being so frank.
Posted by on Mar 02, 2008 @ 10:11 PMThanks for that confirmation, Mary.
The overlaps in analysis seemed obvious, but I thought it worthwhile to link back to the post where we noted your, also excellent, article as you’ve focused on some other areas which Ware didn’t cover in that first part.
I agree he did an excellent job - with some much needed frank interviews.. even from Mandelson.
Looking forward to the other two parts in the series.
Posted by on Mar 02, 2008 @ 10:22 PMPete,
Thanks to you for mentioning my article on several occasions. Other media outlets have been somewhat reluctant to touch this story, which is unfortunate as I think that it is one of the most important stories of the post-Agreement period. So bravo to you and the rest of the Slugger bloggers for not shying away from it.
Posted by on Mar 02, 2008 @ 10:31 PMThanks again, Mary,
We try not to shy away from good analysis.
Hopefully Ware’s series will encourage others to do the same.
“one of the most important stories of the post-Agreement period”
I completely agree.
Posted by on Mar 02, 2008 @ 10:52 PMWhy do you two see the American influence as so important? Money? I don’t buy that. What was their carrot/stick? This visas and fundraising stuff doesn’t work for me, while I was a member of SF I never had a perception of a need for US funds. I think his is external, uniformed analysis pretending authority.
Posted by on Mar 02, 2008 @ 11:28 PM“I think his is external, uniformed analysis pretending authority”, Mark?
Who he?
But I suspect you’re missing the point - as you often did, as I recall, when you were a member of Sinn Féin.
It’s not about the US funding, per se.
It’s about how the US, the Irish, and the UK governments reacted to various pronoucements by Sinn Féin - or rather by Gerry Adams.
And, in particular, about how those reactions impacted on the public perception of the various players at particular points in The Process™.
Posted by on Mar 02, 2008 @ 11:47 PMMark,
I don’t think it’s an accident that the Americans were heavily involved in the South African, Israeli/Palestenian, and NI efforts all around the same time. We could throw in Bosnia too.
It seems to me fairly clear that the US was trying to mop up various conflicts now that the Cold War was over. And it was applying a fairly similar map. Conflict management through the awarding of influence to each group in each area, as long as the correct social and economic arrangements were in place. Hence why Croatia got US help and Serbia got bombed.
I don’t think it was necessarily the cash. But it was certainly the influence that came with support from the US, and perhaps more importantly the media coverage that came with it. Which greatly enabled the growth of the number of voters, especially in the south.
Let’s not forget how extensive US involvement was and still is. Things like training politicians from virtually every party and “community leaders” in the US; not just the US government is involved, but some leading universities, and many businesses. Then we have people from the chattering classes of NI getting jobs training Bosnians etc in how to be democrats. There is a lot more to US involvement than outlined in the article.
I also think there is little doubt that the envoys cracked the whip on several occasions, and got results.
Posted by on Mar 02, 2008 @ 11:53 PMFascinating stuff - Reiss the hardliner against softie Blair eh? A new line - nice prog - remind us about the next episodes Peter!
Posted by on Mar 03, 2008 @ 12:09 AMJohn Ware produced a fine program. As time passes it is clearer that Blair messed up from the beginning by not applying the stick, and applying it hard from the time of provo capitulation. When you have the strong hand, only a fool does not use it in such situations with the type of people involved. Blair’s handling of the negotiations turned what should have been ‘you will do this, or else’ into a ten year garden party.
Our Mitchell Reiss did what he could but would not risk the US-UK relationship. He saw things much clearer than his predecessor which, I think, Mary Alice C. Clancy covered in her important paper. It’s incredible Tom Kelly proffers that history will judge #10 getting it right when even now the evidence is mounting that they got it wrong from the very beginning.
Posted by on Mar 03, 2008 @ 05:25 AM‘I never had a perception of a need for US funds’
Mark if you are a member of SF I would imagine that you would realise that the loss of your party’s largest source of legitimate income would be fairly catastrophic in terms of SF’s electoral expansion plans.
Posted by on Mar 03, 2008 @ 09:20 AMWare did a good job of illustrating the value of Washington’s input, which you can imagine as a lever on the controls of power. That’s where it becomes important to Sinn Fein: with Washington’s approval, more concessions slide their way; without the approval, nothing comes their way. Put it to you like this, if it did not matter, why would Adams have lied to the Brits about going to the White House? It’s like a sneaky teenager who knows that Daddy won’t let him but tells softy Mum that Daddy changed his mind at the last minute so can he go to the party after all, please? Hoping that Mum won’t call Daddy to verify.
In addition, having Washington and the appearance of Irish America on sides gives great bluff value for Sinn Fein, makes them appear more important than they actually are. When they are out in the cold of Washington and Irish America, they are quite naked, and it is possible to seem how irrelevant in the big scheme of things they truly are.
It’s not just about funds but as was pointed out, losing the main legitimate source of millions has got to hurt.
Posted by on Mar 03, 2008 @ 10:05 AM‘that there is simply no place in a democracy for a private army engaged in illegal activity.’
I guess the people of New Orleans just imagined the foreign mercenaries that took over the city after Hurricane Katrina.
Greenflag,
“At least then Mr McCains grandchildren may not have to be sold off into slavery to pay for the war adventures of the American Republicans ?”
Why does everyone seem to think that the Eternal War will end under Obama? A brilliant orator, true, but his words are bland nothings and others pull his strings.
Posted by on Mar 03, 2008 @ 11:25 AMThe essential problem is with Reiss and his self-aggrandisement.
Consider his version (which is specific to his term of enstoolment, i.e. the interim between Haass and Dobriansky):
President Bush’s former special envoy to Ireland has signalled his distaste for what he regarded as No. 10 Downing Street’s indulgence of IRA demands during the Northern Ireland peace process.
Dr Mitchell Reiss says he had “some pretty violent disagreements” with No. 10 over how much “pain to inflict” on Sinn Fein to push them into delivering their side of the Good Friday Agreement.
Now put that alongside George Brock, reviewing three long-way-less-than-perfect books for last week’s Times Literary Supplement:
We can also now grasp some clues to the central mystery: why did the IRA settle for so little?
... Many accounts of the “peace process” suggest that Adams turned the IRA towards elections; many leave his exact motives for this switch mysterious. Somehow the hard man softened. By the early 1990s of course, the climate made violence less appealing: a healthier economy gave more people more stake in a peaceful life (not least in the Republic), Catholics learned that the logic of “armed struggle” looked better in theory than practice, and 9/11 dealt a fatal blow to help and money from the US. Adams may well have been inclined towards politics; but he had no choice. There was no fallback to force if politics failed; force was over…
The defeat of an organization dedicated to political murder comes at a colossal price; governments are naturally not keen to stress just how high that can be. From the mid-1990s onwards, London was single-mindedly committed to ensuring that the IRA went out of the murder business. As they inched towards the finish line, John Major and Tony Blair could take risks with the deadlines and the small print of the arms decommissioning timetable because they were intimately well informed about what was going on inside the IRA and Sinn Féin. They could afford concessions because they knew for sure from the inside that the long-term trend was in their favour.
Brock’s analysis (that of a professional journalist who reported from “on the spot") seems to me to be infinitely preferable to a State Department desk-man, flying in-and-out on whims and reliant of third and fourth hand assessments).
We are not going to get any definitive answer to Brock’s opening question there (despite any small wash of memoirs, especially those sanitised by Downing Street) in my life-time. However, his conclusion seems as valid as any, and particularly appropriate to a Bush apparatchik and Mitt Romney wannabe:
If there are lessons from counter-terrorism in Ulster, they seem to be this. Recruit very good spies; then hire some more. Then give it time to work. The murders, the long wait and the compromises of the exit strategy may well grind the moderates to dust. Then wait some more. After that, the politicians can make their entrance.
Posted by on Mar 03, 2008 @ 12:41 PMMalcolm,
I think you’re putting way too much credit on Brock’s analysis, which relies, at the end of the day, on Maloney’s Adams had the whole thing planned since 1979ish, and everything that happened afterwards was aimed specifically at achieving what happened since then thesis. With heavy hints that Adams and/or Mc Guiness was a tout.
There clearly was heavy penetration of the Provos, but not enough to stop the campaign, which could have gone on indefinitely, both at home and in bombings in Britain (in fact, that the Canary Wharf bombing came as such a surprise suggests that the penetration was exaggerated).
The real reason for Provo movement to peaceful means is simple. More influence and power was available through the ballot box, especially in the south, and to prop up the ballot box, the violence had to go. It had little to do with British spies, and nothing to do with loyalist murders, despite what those like Johnny Adair like to tell themselves.
I also think it entirely possible Brock is pushing a British neo-con agenda heavily associated with people who once clustered around David Trimble, and especially Dean Godson. That is to say, the way to achieve peace is through military and not political means. Through naked power and not compromise. This attitude is typified by the workings of the Henry Jackson Society.
As for Brock’s reporting on the spot, to be honest I’ve never heard of him. The Times correspondent for much of the peace process was David Sharrack, while for the Observer it was Mary Holland, Henry Mc Donald and others. So he may well have been on the spot, but not I would suggest for many years.
In short, there is a very flawed and very dangerous thesis at work here, that is not so much about NI but has quite a lot to do with Israel and Palestine and the Middle East.
Posted by on Mar 03, 2008 @ 12:55 PMJohn Ware produced a fine program. As time passes it is clearer that Blair messed up from the beginning by not applying the stick, and applying it hard from the time of provo capitulation. When you have the strong hand, only a fool does not use it in such situations with the type of people involved. Blair’s handling of the negotiations turned what should have been ‘you will do this, or else’ into a ten year garden party.
Except..... the original IRA ceasefire broke down because of a lack of progress. It is almost certain that at the start, at least, applying more “stick” would have had the same result and played straight into the hands of the hard liners.
If Adams used the threat of dissidents to squeeze out concessions, it was only effectively because to an extent that threat was perceived to be real. I wonder how much Omagh fed into that perception.
Posted by on Mar 03, 2008 @ 01:02 PMI think we’re talking about a period sometime well after Omagh. From a non-republican perspective, the British were ‘all carrot and no stick’ despite knowing that SF did actually respond to tactically-applied pressure.
Reiss perhaps realised that a ‘good cop, bad cop routine’ was more likely to achieve results.
On the issue of the British having inside knowledge on SF’s position on policing, I think most people could see that it was inevitable that SF would eventually support the PSNI. It was more a question of when, and there appeared to be much dilly-dallying over minutiae. This was possibly to extract more concessions without giving much in return - an understandable tactic if you know that the British know you’re going to take the plunge at some point. From everyone else’s point of view, this was damaging to the Process (TM) and confidence in SF to deliver.
Reiss playing hardball because SF played hardball. I’m not sure if his moves were decisive, but they certainly moved things along. Love him or loathe him, McDowell echoing Reiss’s line complemented that effort. It totally pissed SF off, but there was simply no other political protagonist who could put pressure on at that point in time, as the British had kid gloves on.
In a way, Reiss’ line merely helped SF to where they were going anyway, by giving them a boot up the backside.
Posted by on Mar 03, 2008 @ 01:25 PMI don’t disagree that a harder line helped push SF along (and the DUP too, for that matter) but I think the timing also helped. SF had taken several knocks e.g. the McCartney’s, the Northern Bank which arguably they still haven’t totally recovered from. I can’t picture how SF jump on board with policing in 2003 and I think there had to be at least the appearance of more concessions a la St Andrews for them to get it through without SF taking more political damage.
Posted by on Mar 03, 2008 @ 01:35 PMThe DUP and SF were an unsightly boil on the arse of society here and needed to be lanced. That has happened now and after a period of convalescence, society will return to full strength again, (after having been forced to carry with it a pain in the arse for over 30 year ;-).
Posted by on Mar 03, 2008 @ 01:45 PMkensei
Don’t think I really disagree with your 12.35, especially re timing. I do think that SF (leadership) had psychologically prepared itself for policing long before 2003, but of course, convincing rank and file takes longer.
SF’s reluctance to take the final step on policing reminded me of the nervous groom who makes it to the alter, then suddenly wonders if he’s ready to make a lifetime commitment. Reiss was a bit like a best man who takes him aside and tells him to get a grip on himself.
Bad analogy, but sure...!
Posted by on Mar 03, 2008 @ 01:54 PM
